

I

The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena

1. All the data of our consciousness are divided into two great classes—the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena. We spoke of this distinction earlier when we established the concept of psychology, and we returned to it again in our discussion of psychological method. But what we have said is still not sufficient. We must now establish more firmly and more exactly what was only mentioned in passing before.

This seems all the more necessary since neither agreement nor complete clarity has been achieved regarding the delimitation of the two classes. We have already seen how physical phenomena which appear in the imagination are sometimes taken for mental phenomena. There are many other such instances of confusion. And even important psychologists may be hard pressed to defend themselves against the charge of self-contradiction.* For instance, we encounter statements like the following: sensation and imagination are distinguished by the fact that one occurs as the result of a physical phenomenon, while the other is evoked by a mental phenomenon according to the laws of association. But then the same psychologists admit that what appears in sensation does not correspond to its efficient cause. Thus it turns out that the so-called physical phenomenon does not actually appear to us, and, indeed, that we have no presentation of it whatsoever—certainly a curious misuse of the term “phenomenon”! Given such a state of affairs, we cannot avoid going into the question in somewhat greater detail.

* In this respect, I, at least, cannot reconcile the different definitions given by Bain in one of his latest psychological works, *Mental Science*, 3rd ed. (London, 1872). On p. 120, No. 59, he says that mental science (Science of Mind, which he also calls Subject science) is grounded on self-consciousness or introspective attention; the eye, the ear, the organs or touch being only the media for the observation of the physical world, or the “object world,” as he expresses it. On the other hand, on p. 198, No. 4, he says that, “The perception of matter or the Object consciousness is connected with the putting forth of Muscular Energy, as opposed to Passive Feeling.” And by way of explanation, he adds, “In purely *passive* feeling as in those of our sensations that do not call forth our muscular energies, we are not perceiving matter, we are in a state of subject consciousness.” He illustrates this with the example of the sensation of warmth that one has when taking a warm bath, and with those cases of gentle contact in which there is no muscular activity, and declares that, under the same conditions, sounds and possibly even light and color could be “a purely subject experience.” Thus he takes as illustrations to substantiate subject consciousness the very sensations from the eye, ear and organs of touch, which he had characterized as indicators of “object consciousness” in opposition to “subject consciousness.”

2. The explanation we are seeking is not a definition according to the traditional rules of logic. These rules have recently been the object of impartial criticism, and much could be added to what has already been said. Our aim is to clarify the meaning of the two terms “*physical phenomenon*” and “*mental phenomenon*” removing all misunderstanding and confusion concerning them. And it does not matter to us what means we use, as long as they really serve to clarify these terms.

To this end, it is not sufficient merely to specify more general, more inclusive definitions. Just as deduction is opposed to induction when we speak of kinds of proof, in this case explanation by means of subsumption under a general term is opposed to explanation by means of particulars, through examples. And the latter kind of explanation is appropriate whenever the particular terms are clearer than the general ones. Thus it is probably a more effective procedure to explain the term “color” by saying that it designates the class which contains red, blue, green and yellow, than to do the opposite and attempt to explain “red” by saying it is a particular kind of color. Moreover, explanation through particular definitions will be of even greater use when we are dealing, as in our case, with terms which are not common in ordinary life, while those for the individual phenomena included under them are frequently used. So let us first of all try to clarify the concepts by means of examples.

Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon.¹ By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term. I also mean by it the thinking of a general concept, provided such a thing actually does occur. Furthermore, every judgement, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a mental phenomenon. Also to be included under this term is every emotion: joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt, etc.

¹ “*Examples of mental phenomena.*” Brentano consequently understands “mental phenomenon” to mean the same as “mental activity,” and what is characteristic of it, in his opinion, is the “reference to something as object,” i.e. being concerned with something. With this the word *φαινόμενον* has become mere “internal linguistic form.” The same thing holds true of the word “activity,” since in Brentano’s opinion every such activity, at least in men and animals, is a *passio*, an affection in the Aristotelian sense. So what we are concerned with is the sheer “having something as object” as the distinguishing feature of any act of consciousness, which Brentano also calls “state of consciousness,” in Book One, Chap. 1, Sect. 2. Supplementary essay II is more precise on this point and on the further distinction between mental activity and mental reference. It would be better to avoid the expression “phenomenon,” even though according to Brentano every consciousness not only has something appearing to it but appears to itself (see Book Two, Chap. 2).

Examples of physical phenomena,² on the other hand, are a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination.

These examples may suffice to illustrate the differences between the two classes of phenomena.

3. Yet we still want to try to find a different and a more unified way of explaining mental phenomena. For this purpose we make use of a definition we used earlier when we said that the term “mental phenomena” applies to presentations as well as to all the phenomena which are based upon presentations. It is hardly necessary to mention again that by “presentation” we do not mean that which is presented, but rather the presenting of it. This act of presentation forms the foundation not merely of the act of judging, but also of desiring and of every other mental act. Nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing.³ Thus the definition given includes all the examples of mental phenomena which we listed above, and in general all the phenomena belonging to this domain.

It is a sign of the immature state of psychology that we can scarcely utter a single sentence about mental phenomena which will not be disputed by many people. Nevertheless, most psychologists agree with what we have just said, namely, that presentations are the foundation for the other mental phenomena. Thus Herbart asserts quite rightly, “Every

² In citing examples of physical phenomena, Brentano intends to bring in first of all examples of “physical phenomena” which are given directly in perception. Thus he enumerates: colors, shapes, musical chords, warmth, cold, odors. In each of these cases we are concerned with objects of our sensations, what is sensed. Now “a landscape, which I see” has slipped in among these examples. But it was obvious for Brentano that I cannot see a landscape, only something colored, extended, bounded in some way. In his books and articles on the history of philosophy, Brentano repeatedly emphasized as one of the most fundamental rules of interpretation, that philosophical writers are to be interpreted in the context of all their work. Now anyone who takes notice of Brentano’s *Psychologie des Aristoteles* (Mainz, 1876), will find that on p. 84 he deals with that which is sensible *per accidens*. Aristotle uses an example to explain the sensible *per accidens*: someone sees the son of Diars. Now, to be sure, we can say that he sees the son of Diars, but he does not see him as such. He sees something white and it is a fact concerning the white thing he sees that it is the son of Diars. This should at least have called attention to the fact that Brentano does not believe one can see a landscape in the same way that one can see something variously colored. In other words, landscape is no sense-quality and cannot be an object of direct sense-perception. What one sees, when one “sees” a landscape are extended colored shapes at some distance from us. Everything else is a matter of interpretation in terms of judgements and concepts. One can find fault with the example, then, in that it includes “landscape” among the “physical phenomena” belonging to our *direct perception*. Thus Husserl accuses Brentano of having confused “sense contents” with “external objects” that appear to us and of holding that physical phenomena “exist only phenomenally or intentionally.” But this accusation is shown to be wrong in the Introduction to the present book. According to Brentano, we have perceptions of the mental and perceptions of the physical; the former exhibit nothing that is extended and the latter are restricted to what is qualitative and extended.

³ The descriptive psychological law that Brentano here expresses is not obtained inductively but is self-evident in view of the concepts of presentation, judgement, and appetition. See Introduction, p. 370, and *The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*.

time we have a feeling, there will be something or other presented in consciousness, even though it may be something very diversified, confused and varied, so that this particular presentation is included in this particular feeling. Likewise, whenever we desire something... we have before our minds that which we desire.”*

Herbart then goes further, however. He sees all other phenomena as nothing but certain states of presentations which are derivable from the presentations themselves. This view has already been attacked repeatedly with decisive arguments, in particular by Lotze. Most recently, J.B.Meyer, among others, has set forth a long criticism of it in his account of Kant’s psychology. But Meyer was not satisfied to deny that feelings and desires could be derived from presentations. He claims that phenomena of this kind can exist in the absence of presentations.† Indeed, Meyer believes that the lowest forms of animal life have feelings and desires, but no presentations and also that the lives of higher animals and men begin with mere feelings and desires, while presentations emerge only upon further development.‡ Thus Meyer, too, seems to come into conflict with our claim.

But, if I am not mistaken, the conflict is more apparent than real. Several of his expressions suggest that Meyer has a narrower concept of presentation than we have, while he correspondingly broadens the concept of feeling. “Presentation,” he says, “begins when the modification which we experience in our own state can be understood as the result of an external stimulus, even if this at first expresses itself only in the unconscious looking around or feeling around for an external object which results from it.” If Meyer means by “presentation” the same thing that we do, he could not possibly speak in this way. He would see that a condition such as the one he describes as the origin of presentation, already involves an abundance of presentations, for example, the idea of temporal succession, ideas of spatial proximity and ideas of cause and effect. If all of these ideas must already be present in the mind in order for there to be a presentation in Meyer’s sense, it is absolutely clear that such a thing cannot be the basis of every other mental phenomenon. Even the “being present” of any single one of the things mentioned is “being presented” in our sense. And such things occur whenever something appears in consciousness, whether it is hated, loved, or regarded indifferently, whether it is affirmed or denied or there is a complete withholding of judgement and—I cannot express myself in any other way than to say—it is presented. As we use the verb “to present,” “to be presented” means the same as “to appear.”

Meyer himself admits that a presentation in this sense is pre-supposed by every feeling of pleasure and pain, even the lowliest, although, since his terminology differs from ours, he calls this a feeling and not a presentation. At least that is what seems to me to emerge from the following passage: “There is no intermediate state between sensation and non-sensation... Now the simplest form of sensation need be nothing more than a mere *sensation of change* in one’s own body or a part thereof, caused by some stimulus. Beings endowed with such sensations would only have a *feeling of their own states*. A sensibility of the soul for the changes which are favorable or harmful to it could very well be directly

* *Psychologie als Wissenschaft*, Part II, Sect. 1, Chap. 1, No. 103. Cp. also Drobisch, *Empirische Psychologie*, p. 38, and others of Herbart’s school.

† *Kant’s Psychologie* (Berlin, 1870), pp. 92 ff.

‡ *Kant’s Psychologie*, p. 94.

connected with this *vital feeling* for the events beneath one's own skin, even if this *new sensitivity* could not simply be derived from that feeling: such a soul could *have feelings* of pleasure and pain *along with the sensation...* A soul so endowed still has no Presentations."^{*} It is easy to see that what is, in our view, the only thing which deserves the name "feeling," also emerges according to J.B.Meyer as the second element. It is preceded by another element which falls under the concept of a presentation as we understand it, and which constitutes the indispensable precondition for this second phenomenon. So it would seem that if Meyer's view were translated into our terminology, the opposition would disappear automatically.

Perhaps a similar situation obtains, too, in the case of others who express themselves in a manner similar to Meyer's. Yet it may still be the case that with respect to some kinds of sensory pleasure and pain feelings, someone may really be of the opinion that there are no presentations involved, even in our sense. At least we cannot deny that there is a certain temptation to do this. This is true, for example, with regard to the feelings present when one is cut or burned. When someone is cut he has no perception of touch, and someone who is burned has no feeling of warmth, but in both cases there is only the feeling of pain.

Nevertheless there is no doubt that even here the feeling is based upon a presentation. In cases such as this we always have a presentation of a definite spatial location which we usually characterize in relation to some visible and touchable part of our body. We say that our foot or our hand hurts, that this or that part of the body is in pain. Those who consider such a spatial presentation something originally given by the neural stimulation itself cannot deny that a presentation is the basis of this feeling. But others cannot avoid this assumption either. For there is in us not only the idea of a definite spatial location but also that of a particular sensory quality analogous to color, sound and other so-called sensory qualities, which is a physical phenomenon and which must be clearly distinguished from the accompanying feeling. If we hear a pleasing and mild sound or a shrill one, harmonious chord or a dissonance, it would not occur to anyone to identify the sound with the accompanying feeling of pleasure or pain. But then in cases where a feeling of pain or pleasure is aroused in us by a cut, a burn or a tickle, we must distinguish in the same way between a physical phenomenon, which appears as the object of external perception, and the mental phenomenon of feeling, which accompanies its appearance, even though in this case the superficial observer is rather inclined to confuse them.

^{*} *Kant's Psychologie*, p. 92. J.B.Meyer seems to conceive of sensation in the same way as Überweg in his *Logik I*, 2nd ed., p. 64. "Perception differs from mere sensation in that in sensation we are conscious only of the subjective state, while in perception there is another element which is perceived and which therefore stands apart from the act of perception as something different and objective." Even if Überweg's view of the difference between sensation and perception were correct, sensation would still involve a presentation in our sense. Why we consider it to be incorrect will be apparent later.

The principal basis for this misconception is probably the following. It is well known that our perceptions are mediated by the so-called afferent nerves. In the past people thought that certain nerves served as conductors of each kind of sensory qualities, such as color, sound, etc. Recently, however, physiologists have been more and more inclined to take the opposite point of view.* And they teach almost universally that the nerves for tactile sensations, if stimulated in a certain way, produce sensations of warmth and cold in us, and if stimulated in another way produce in us so-called pleasure and pain sensations. In reality, however, something similar is true for all the nerves, insofar as a sensory phenomenon of the kind just mentioned can be produced in us by every nerve. In the presence of very strong stimuli, all nerves produce painful phenomena, which cannot be distinguished from one another.† When a nerve transmits different kinds of sensations, it often happens that it transmits several at the same time. Looking into an electric light, for example, produces simultaneously a “beautiful,” i.e. pleasant, color phenomenon and a phenomenon of another sort which is painful. The nerves of the tactile sense often simultaneously transmit a so-called sensation of touch, a sensation of warmth or cold, and a so-called sensation of pleasure or pain. Now we notice that when several sensory phenomena appear at the same time, they are not infrequently regarded as *one*. This has been demonstrated in a striking manner in regard to the sensations of smell and taste. It is well established that almost all the differences usually considered differences in taste are really only differences in the concomitant olfactory phenomena. Something similar occurs when we eat food cold or warm; we often think that it tastes different while in reality only the temperature sensations differ. It is not surprising, then, if we do not always distinguish precisely between a phenomenon which is a temperature sensation and another which is a tactile sensation. Perhaps we would not even distinguish between them at all if they did not ordinarily appear independently of one another. If we now look at the sensations of feeling,⁴ we find, on the contrary, that their phenomena are usually linked with another sort of sensation, and when the excitation is very strong these other sensations sink into insignificance beside them. Thus the fact that a given individual has been mistaken about the appearance of a particular class of sensory qualities and has believed that he has had one single sensation instead of two is very easily explained. Since the intervening idea was accompanied by a relatively very strong feeling, incomparably stronger than that which followed upon the first kind of quality, the person considers this mental phenomenon as the only new thing he has experienced. In addition, if the first kind of quality disappeared completely, then he would believe that he possessed only a feeling without any underlying presentation of a physical phenomenon.

A further basis for this illusion is the fact that the quality which precedes the feeling and the feeling itself do not have two distinct names. The physical phenomenon which appears along with the feeling of pain is also called pain. Indeed, we do not say that we sense this or that phenomenon in the foot with pain; we say that we feel pain in the foot. This is an equivocation, such as, indeed, we often find when different things are closely

* Cp. especially Wundt, *Principles of Physiological Psychology* (trans. Titchener), pp. 322 ff.

† Cp. below, Book Two, Chap. III, Sect. 6.

⁴ On “sensations of feeling,” compare Brentano’s controversy with Stumpf in *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie*.

related to one another. We call the body healthy, and in reference to it we say that the air, the food, the color of the face, etc., are healthy, but obviously in another sense. In our case, the physical phenomenon itself is called pleasure or pain after the feeling of pleasure or pain which accompanies the appearance of the physical phenomenon, and there, too, in a modified sense of the words. It is as if we would say of a harmonious chord that it is a pleasure because we experience pleasure when we hear it, or, too, that the loss of a friend is a great sorrow for us. Experience shows that equivocation is one of the main obstacles to recognizing distinctions. And it must necessarily be the largest obstacle here where there is an inherent danger of confusion and perhaps the extension of the term was itself the result of this confusion. Thus many psychologists were deceived by this equivocation and this error fostered further errors.

Some came to the false conclusion that the sensing subject must be present at the spot in the injured limb in which a painful phenomenon is located in perception.⁵ Then, since they identified the phenomenon with the accompanying pain sensation, they regarded this phenomenon as a mental rather than a physical phenomenon. It is precisely for this reason that they thought that its perception in the limb was an inner, and consequently evident and infallible perception.* Their view is contradicted by the fact that the same phenomena often appear in the same way after the amputation of the limb. For this reason others argued, in a rather skeptical manner, against the self-evidence of inner perception. The difficulty disappears if we distinguish between pain in the sense in which the term describes the apparent condition of a part of our body, and the feeling of pain which is connected with the concomitant sensation. Keeping this in mind, we shall no longer be inclined to assert that there is no presentation at the basis of the feeling of sensory pain experienced when one is injured.

Accordingly, we may consider the following definition of mental phenomena as indubitably correct: they are either presentations or they are based upon presentations in the sense described above. Such a definition offers a second, more simple explanation of this concept. This explanation, of course, is not completely unified because it separates mental phenomena into two groups.

4. People have tried to formulate a completely unified definition which distinguishes all mental phenomena from physical phenomena by means of negation. All physical phenomena, it is said, have extension and spatial location, whether they are phenomena of vision or of some other sense, or products of the imagination, which presents similar objects to us. The opposite, however, is true of mental phenomena; thinking, willing and the like appear without extension and without spatial location.

According to this view, it would be possible for us to characterize physical phenomena easily and exactly in contrast to mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which appear extended and localized in space. Mental phenomena would then be definable with equal exactness as those phenomena which do not have extension or spatial location. Descartes and Spinoza could be cited in support of such a distinction. The chief advocate of this view, however, is Kant, who explains space as the form of the intuition of the external sense.

⁵ Here "perception" is taken in the loose and extended sense, for localization in the foot goes beyond sensation.

* This is the opinion of the Jesuit, Tongiorgi, in his widely circulated philosophy textbook.

Recently Bain has given the same definition:

The department of the Object, or Object—World, is exactly circumscribed by one property, Extension. The world of Subject-experience is devoid of this property. A tree or a river is said to possess extended magnitude. A pleasure has no length, breadth, or thickness; it is in no respect an extended thing. A thought or idea may refer to extended magnitudes, but it cannot be said to have extension in itself. Neither can we say that an act of the will, a desire or a belief occupy dimensions in space. Hence all that comes within the sphere of the Subject is spoken of as the Unextended.

Thus, if Mind, as commonly happens, is put for the sum-total of Subject-experiences, we may define it negatively by a single fact—the absence of Extension.*

Thus it seems that we have found, at least negatively, a unified definition for the totality of mental phenomena.

But even on this point there is no unanimity among psychologists, and we hear it denied for contradictory reasons that extension and lack of extension are characteristics which distinguish physical and mental phenomena.

Many declare that this definition is false because not only mental phenomena, but also many physical phenomena appear to be without extension. A large number of not unimportant psychologists, for example, teach that the phenomena of some, or even of all of our senses originally appear apart from all extension and spatial location. In particular, this view is quite generally held with respect to sounds and olfactory phenomena.⁶ It is true of colors according to Berkeley, of the phenomena of touch according to Plainer, and of the phenomena of all the external senses according to Herbart and Lotze, as well as according to Hartley, Brown, the two Mills, H. Spencer and others. Indeed it seems that the phenomena revealed by the external senses, especially sight and the sense of touch, are all spatially extended. The reason for this, it is said, is that we connect them with spatial presentations that are gradually developed on the basis of earlier experiences. They are originally without spatial location, and we subsequently localize them. If this were really the only way in which physical phenomena attain spatial location we could obviously no longer separate the two areas by reference to this property. In fact, mental phenomena are also localized by us in this way, as, for example, when we locate a phenomenon of anger in the irritated lion, and our own thoughts in the space which we occupy.

This is one way in which the above definition has been criticized by a great number of eminent psychologists, including Bain. At first sight he seems to defend such a definition, but in reality he follows Hartley's lead on this issue. He has only been able to express himself as he does because he does not actually consider the phenomena of the external senses, in and for themselves, to be physical phenomena (although he is not always consistent in this).*

* *Mental Science*, Introduction, Chap. 1.

⁶ In the *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie*, Brentano attempts to show that we experience all sense-qualities as being localized.

* Cp. above, p. 77, note.

Others, as we said, will reject this definition for the opposite reason. It is not so much the assertion that all physical phenomena appear extended that provokes them, but rather the assertion that all mental phenomena lack extension. According to them, certain mental phenomena also appear to be extended. Aristotle seems to have been of this opinion when, in the first chapter of this treatise on sense and sense objects he considers it immediately evident, without any prior proof, that sense perception is the act of a bodily organ.[†] Modern psychologists and physiologists sometimes express themselves in the same way regarding certain affects. They speak of feelings of pleasure or pain which appear in the external organs, sometimes even after the amputation of the limb and yet, feeling, like perception, is a mental phenomenon. Some authors even maintain that sensory appetites appear localized. This view is shared by the poet when he speaks, not, to be sure, of thought, but of rapture and longing which suffuse the heart and all parts of the body.⁷

Thus we see that the distinction under discussion is disputed from the point of view of both physical and mental phenomena. Perhaps both of these objections are equally unjustified.[‡] At any rate, another definition common to all mental phenomena is still desirable. Whether certain mental and physical phenomena appear extended or not, the controversy proves that the criterion given for a clear separation is not adequate. Furthermore, this criterion gives us only a negative definition of mental phenomena.⁸

[†] *De Sensu et Sensibili*, 1, 436, b. 7. Cp. also what he says in *De Anima*, I, 1, 403 16, about affective states, in particular about fear.

[‡] The assertion that even mental phenomena appear to be extended rests obviously on a confusion of mental and physical phenomena similar to the confusion which we became convinced of above when we pointed out that a presentation is also the necessary foundation of sensory feelings.

⁷ Brentano was entirely familiar, then, with such false localizations and interpretations. They did not lead him to doubt the evident nature of inner perception. In the Supplementary Essays he emphasizes that this evidence is not affected by the confused character of inner perception. Husserl takes "perception" to refer to complex interpretations and is thus led to dispute the evidence of inner perception.

^{*} *The Senses and the Intellect*, Introduction.

[†] They also use the expression "to exist as an object (objectively) in something," which, if we wanted to use it at the present time, would be considered, on the contrary, as a designation of a real existence outside the mind. At least this is what is suggested by the expression "to exist immanently as an object," which is occasionally used in a similar sense, and in which the term "immanent" should obviously rule out the misunderstanding which is to be feared.

[‡] Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect. In Philo, likewise, we find the doctrine of mental existence and in-existence. However, since he confuses them with existence in the proper sense of the word, he reaches his contradictory doctrine of the *logos* and Ideas. The same is true of the Neoplatonists. St. Augustine in his doctrine of the *Verbum mentis* and of its inner origin touches upon the same fact. St. Anselm does the same in his famous ontological argument; many people have observed that his consideration of mental existence as a true existence is at the basis of his paralogism (cp. Überweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II). St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that the object which is thought is intentionally in the thinking subject, the object which is loved in the person who loves, the object which is desired in the person desiring, and he uses this for theological purposes. When the Scriptures speak of an indwelling of the Holy Ghost, St. Thomas explains it as an intentional indwelling through love. In addition, he attempted to find, through the intentional in-existence in the acts of thinking and loving, a certain analogy for the mystery of the Trinity and the procession *ad intra* of the Word and the Spirit.

⁸ Compare Book Two, Chap. 4, Sect. 3. [note ‡ cont. on p. 89]

5. What positive criterion shall we now be able to provide? Or is there perhaps no positive definition which holds true of all mental phenomena generally? Bain thinks that in fact there is none.* Nevertheless, psychologists in earlier times have already pointed out that there is a special affinity and analogy which exists among all mental phenomena, and which physical phenomena do not share.

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental)[†] inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object⁹ (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing),¹⁰ or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.[‡]

This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves.¹¹

But here, too, we come upon controversies and contradiction. Hamilton, in particular, denies this characteristic to a whole broad class of mental phenomena, namely, to all those which he characterizes as feelings, to pleasure and pain in all their most diverse shades and varieties.¹² With respect to the phenomena of thought and desire he is in agreement with us. Obviously there is no act of thinking without an object that is thought, nor a desire without an object that is desired. “In the phenomena of Feelings—the phenomena of Pleasure and Pain—on the contrary, consciousness does not place the mental modification or state before itself; it does not contemplate it apart—as separate from itself—but is, as it were, fused into one. The peculiarity of Feeling, therefore, is that there is nothing but what is subjectively subjective; there is no object different from the self—no objectification of any mode of

⁹ Brentano here uses “content” synonymously with “object.” He later came to prefer the term “object.”

¹⁰ As we have noted, Brentano subsequently denies that we can have anything “irreal” as object; we can have as object only that which would be a substance or *thing* if it existed.

* *Lecture on Metaphysics*, I, 432.

¹¹ Brentano later acknowledged that the way he attempted to describe consciousness here, adhering to the Aristotelian tradition which asserts “the mental inexistence of the object,” was imperfect. The so-called “inexistence of the object,” the immanent objectivity, is not to be interpreted as a mode of being the thing has in consciousness, but as an imprecise description of the fact that I have something (a thing, real entity, substance) as an object, am mentally concerned with it, refer to it. There are more details on this point in the Supplementary Essays and the Introduction. The Table of Contents speaks more appropriately of “reference to an object.” See note 20.

¹² Here, too, we are concerned with the question already mentioned in Note 1, whether it belongs to the essence of every act of consciousness to be a consciousness of something. Opinions are still divided on this most elementary question in psychology. There is still a distinction drawn today, as there was before Brentano, between objective acts of consciousness and mere states of consciousness. Brentano assails this doctrine with arguments which have remained unrefuted and indeed have gone largely unnoticed. His *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie* has, in particular, been largely ignored.

self.”* In the first instance there would be something which, according to Hamilton’s terminology, is “objective,” in the second instance something which is “objectively subjective,” as in self-awareness, the object of which Hamilton consequently calls the “subject-object.” By denying both concerning feelings, Hamilton rejects unequivocally all intentional in-existence of these phenomena.

In reality, what Hamilton says is not entirely correct, since certain feelings undeniably refer to objects. Our language itself indicates this through the expressions it employs. We say that we are pleased with or about something, that we feel sorrow or grieve about something. Likewise, we say: that pleases me, that hurts me, that makes me feel sorry, etc. Joy and sorrow, like affirmation and negation, love and hate, desire and aversion, clearly follow upon a presentation and are related to that which is presented.

One is most inclined to agree with Hamilton in those cases in which, as we saw earlier, it is most easy to fall into the error that feeling is not based upon any presentation: the case of pain caused by a cut or a burn, for example. But the reason is simply the same temptation toward this, as we have seen, erroneous assumption. Even Hamilton recognizes with us the fact that presentations occur without exception and thus even here they form the basis of the feeling. Thus his denial that feelings have an object seems all the more striking.

One thing certainly has to be admitted; the object to which a feeling refers is not always an external object. Even in cases where I hear a harmonious sound, the pleasure which I feel is not actually pleasure in the sound but pleasure in the hearing.¹³ In fact you could say, not incorrectly, that in a certain sense it even refers to itself, and this introduces, more or less, what Hamilton was talking about, namely that the feeling and the object are “fused into one.” But this is nothing that is not true in the same way of many phenomena of thought and knowledge, as we will see when we come to the investigation of inner consciousness. Still they retain a mental inexistence, a Subject-Object, to use Hamilton’s mode of speech, and the same thing is true of these feelings. Hamilton is wrong when he says that with regard to feelings everything is “subjectively subjective”—an expression which is actually self-contradictory, for where you cannot speak of an object, you cannot speak of a subject either. Also, Hamilton spoke of a fusing into one of the feeling with the mental impression, but when carefully considered it can be seen that he is bearing witness against himself here. Every fusion is a unification of several things; and thus the pictorial expression which is intended to make us concretely aware of the distinctive character of feeling still points to a certain duality in the unity.

We may, therefore, consider the intentional in-existence of an object to be a general characteristic of mental phenomena which distinguishes this class of phenomena from the class of physical phenomena.

* *Lecture on Metaphysics*, I, 432.

¹³ The Supplementary Essays and the *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie* exclude sensual affects of pleasure from sensations of *hearing and seeing*, limit them, that is, to what Brentano called the “*Spürsinn*.” On this view, pleasure in hearing something is an affect of the “*Spürsinn*” which accompanies and is elicited by the hearing of it. [Translators’ note: Brentano classified the sense-modalities in such a way that sensations other than visual and aural ones were grouped under one heading, to which he attached this term. Any attempt at a literal translation would merely be misleading.]

6. Another characteristic which all mental phenomena have in common is the fact that they are only perceived in inner consciousness, while in the case of physical phenomena only external perception is possible. This distinguishing characteristic is emphasized by Hamilton.*

It could be argued that such a definition is not very meaningful. In fact, it seems much more natural to define the act according to the object, and therefore to state that inner perception, in contrast to every other kind, is the perception of mental phenomena. However, besides the fact that it has a special object, inner perception possesses another distinguishing characteristic: its immediate, infallible self-evidence. Of all the types of knowledge of the objects of experience, inner perception alone possesses this characteristic. Consequently, when we say that mental phenomena are those which are apprehended by means of inner perception, we say that their perception is immediately evident.

Moreover, inner perception is not merely the only kind of perception which is immediately evident; it is really the only perception in the strict sense of the word.† As we have seen, the phenomena of the so-called external perception cannot be proved true and real even by means of indirect demonstration. For this reason, anyone who in good faith has taken them for what they seem to be is being misled by the manner in which the phenomena are connected. Therefore, strictly speaking, so-called external perception is not perception. Mental phenomena, therefore, may be described as the only phenomena of which perception in the strict sense of the word is possible. This definition, too, is an adequate characterization of mental phenomena. That is not to say that all mental phenomena are internally perceivable by all men, and so all those which someone cannot perceive are to be included by him among physical phenomena. On the contrary, as we have already expressly noted above, it is obvious that no mental phenomenon is perceived by more than one individual. At the same time, however, we also saw that every type of mental phenomenon is present in every fully developed human mental life. For this reason, the reference to the phenomena which constitute the realm of inner perception serves our purpose satisfactorily.

7. We said that mental phenomena are those phenomena which alone can be perceived in the strict sense of the word. We could just as well say that they are those phenomena which alone possess real existence as well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire really exist. Color, sound and warmth have only a phenomenal and intentional existence.¹⁴

There are philosophers who go so far as to say that it is self-evident that phenomena such as those which we call physical phenomena *could not* correspond to any reality. According to them, the assertion that these phenomena have an existence different from mental existence is self-contradictory. Thus, for example, Bain says that attempts have been made to

† [Translators' note: The German word which we translate as "perception" is "*Wahrnehmung*" which literally means taking something to be true. The English word does not reflect this literal meaning so this paragraph only makes sense if we bear in mind the German word.]

* *Mental Science*, 3rd ed., p. 198.

¹⁴ This passage also makes clear what Brentano intended as the object of outer perception; "color, sound, heat," in brief, sense-qualities, that someone having a sensation senses—what is sensed—but not "landscapes" or "boxes."

explain the phenomena of external perception by supposing a material world, “in the first instance, detached from perception, and, afterwards, coming into perception, by operating upon the mind.” “This view,” he says, “involves a contradiction. The prevailing doctrine is that a tree is something in itself apart from all perception; that, by its luminous emanations, it impresses our mind and is then perceived, the perception being an effect, and the unperceived tree [i.e. the one which exists outside of perception] the cause. But the tree is known only through perception; what it may be anterior to, or independent of, perception, we cannot tell; we can think of it as perceived but not as unperceived. There is a manifest contradiction in the supposition; we are required at the same moment to perceive the thing and not to perceive it. We know the touch of iron, but we cannot know the touch apart from the touch.”*

I must confess that I am unable to convince myself of the soundness of this argument. It is undoubtedly true that a color appears to us only when we have a presentation of it. We cannot conclude from this, however, that a color cannot exist without being presented. Only if the state of being presented were contained in the color as one of its elements, as a certain quality and intensity is contained in it, would a color which is not presented imply a contradiction, since a whole without one of its parts is indeed a contradiction. But this is obviously not the case. Otherwise, it would also be absolutely inconceivable how the belief in the real existence of physical phenomena outside our presentation could have, not to say originated, but achieved the most general dissemination, been maintained with the utmost tenacity, and, indeed, even been shared for a long time by the most outstanding thinkers. Bain said: “We can think of a tree as perceived, but not as unperceived. There is a manifest contradiction in the supposition.” If what he said were correct, his further conclusions could not be objected to. But it is precisely this which cannot be granted. Bain explains this statement by remarking, “We are required at the same moment to perceive the thing and not to perceive it.” It is not correct, however, to say that such a demand is placed upon us, for, in the first place, not every act of thinking is a perception. Secondly, even if this were the case, it would only follow that we can think only of trees that have been perceived by us, but not that we can think only of trees *as perceived by us*. To taste a piece of white sugar does not mean to taste a piece of sugar *as white*. The fallacy reveals itself quite clearly in the case of mental phenomena. If someone said, “I cannot think about a mental phenomenon without thinking about it; therefore I can only think about mental phenomena as thought by me; therefore no mental phenomenon exists outside my thinking,” his method of reasoning would be identical to that of Bain. Nevertheless, even Bain will not deny that his individual mental life is not the only one which has actual existence. When Bain adds: “we know the touch of iron, but it is not possible that we should know the touch apart from the touch,” he obviously uses the word “touch” first to mean the object that is sensed and secondly to mean the act of sensing. These are different concepts, even though the word is the same. Consequently, only those who would let themselves be deceived by this equivocation could grant the existence of immediate evidence as postulated by Bain.

It is not correct, therefore, to say that the assumption that there exists a physical phenomenon outside the mind which is just as real as those which we find intentionally in us, implies a contradiction.¹⁵

It is only that, when we compare one with the other we discover conflicts which clearly show that no real existence corresponds to the intentional existence in this case. And even if this applies only to the realm of our own experience, we will nevertheless make no mistake if in general we deny to physical phenomena any existence other than intentional existence.¹⁶

8. There is still another circumstance which people have said distinguishes between physical and mental phenomena. They say that mental phenomena always manifest themselves serially, while many physical phenomena manifest themselves simultaneously. But people do not always mean the same thing by this assertion, and not all of the meanings which it has been given are in accord with the truth.

Recently Herbert Spencer expressed himself on this subject in the following vein : “The two great classes of vital actions called Physiology and Psychology are broadly distinguished in this, that while the one includes both simultaneous and successive changes the other includes successive changes only. The phenomena forming the subject matter of Physiology present themselves as an immense number of different series bound up together. Those forming the subject matter of psychology present themselves as but a single series. A glance at the many continuous actions constituting the life of the body at large shows that they are synchronous—that digestion, circulation, respiration, excretion, secretions, etc., in all their many sub-divisions are going on at one time in mutual dependence. And the briefest introspection makes it clear that the actions constituting thought occur, not

¹⁵ We see from this that the account in the Table of Contents, Book Two, Chap. I, Sect. 7, is mistaken. Colors and sounds and so on *could* exist, i.e. their existence involves no direct contradiction. But critical inquiry and comparison convinces us of the blindness of our compulsive belief in the objects of outer perception and natural science convinces us of its incorrectness. In this paragraph Brentano uses “perception” in a broader sense, following Bain’s usage. One can no more perceive trees in the sense of sensing them than one can perceive landscapes.

¹⁶ The attempt has been made to stamp Brentano as a phenomenalist on the basis of this sentence. That is completely mistaken. Brentano was always phenomenism’s most determined opponent. All he intends to say is that colored things, sounding extended things are intentionally given, i.e. we have them as objects, and that *such* qualitative extended things cannot be proved to exist, indeed that to affirm is in all probability a mistake. In this connection it is to be noted that the affirmation of colored extended things is false even when there *are* physical bodies. These bodies do not have qualities of color or sound, or the like; but every affirmation is an assertion of the entire content and our sensations are affirmative beliefs in what we sense. It is unconditionally certain that this belief, this impulse to grant their reality, is blind; i.e. it is not intrinsically logically justifiable, not experienced as being correct. This emerges from comparison with acts which are evident. At the same time it is extremely probable, according to all the rules of induction and the calculation of probability, that the belief in the existence of qualitatively extended things is false. The demonstrative force of Locke’s experiments and Aristotle’s experiment with the round ball already reach that far. There are certain equivocations which may still work in favor of naive realism today (as when the physicist speaks of “pressure,” but without thinking of the quality of pressure which we sense).

together, but one after another.”* Spencer restricts his comparison to physiological and physical phenomena found in one and the same organism endowed with mental life. If he had not done this, he would have been forced to admit that many series of mental phenomena occur simultaneously too, because there is more than one living being endowed with mental life in the world. However, even within the limits which he has assigned to it, the assertion he advances is not entirely true. Spencer himself is so far from failing to recognize this fact that he immediately calls attention to those species of lower animals, for example the *radiata*, in which a multiple mental life goes on simultaneously in *one* body. For this reason he thinks—but others will not readily admit it—that there is little difference between mental and physical life.† In addition he makes further concessions which reduce the difference between physiological and mental phenomena to a mere matter of degree. Furthermore, if we ask ourselves what it is that Spencer conceives as those physiological phenomena whose changes, in contrast to the changes of mental phenomena, are supposed to occur simultaneously, it appears that he uses this term not to describe specifically physical phenomena, but rather the causes, which are in themselves unknown, of these phenomena.¹⁷ In fact, with respect to the physical phenomena which manifest themselves in sensation, it seems undeniable that they cannot modify themselves simultaneously, if the sensations themselves do not undergo simultaneous changes. Hence, we can hardly attain a distinguishing characteristic for the two classes of phenomena in this way.

Others have wanted to find a characteristic of mental life in the fact that consciousness can grasp simultaneously only *one object*, never more than one, at a time. They point to the remarkable case of the error that occurs in the determination of time. This error regularly appears in astronomical observations in which the simultaneous swing of the pendulum does not enter into consciousness simultaneously with, but earlier or later than, the moment when the observed star touches the hairline in the telescope.* Thus, mental phenomena always merely follow each other, one at a time, in a simple series. However, it would certainly be a mistake to generalize without further reflection from a case which implies such an extreme concentration of attention. Spencer, at least, says: “I find that there may sometimes be detected as many as five simultaneous series of nervous changes, which in various degrees rise into consciousness so far that we cannot call any of them absolutely unconscious. When walking, there is the locomotive series; there may be, under certain circumstances, a tactual series; there is very often (in myself at least), an auditory series, constituting some melody or fragment of a melody which haunts me; and there is the visual series: all of which, subordinate to the dominant consciousness formed by some train of reflection, are continually crossing it and weaving themselves into it.”† The same facts are reported by Hamilton, Cardaillac, and other psychologists on the basis of their experiences. Assuming, however, that it were true that all cases of perception are similar to that of the

* *Principles of Psychology*, 2nd ed. I, Sect. 177, 395.

† *Principles of Psychology*, p. 397.

¹⁷ See the preceding [Kraus] note. The word “phenomenon” is understood in the narrower sense here, not in the sense of “fact” or “event,” as for example on p. 26.

* Cp. Bessel, *Astronomische Beobachtungen*, Sect. VIII Intro. (Königsberg, 1823), Intro. Struve, *Expedition Chronometrique*, etc. (Petersburg, 1844), p. 29.

† *Principles of Psychology*, p. 398. Drobisch likewise says that it is a “fact that many series of ideas can pass simultaneously through consciousness, but, as it were, at different levels.”

astronomer, should we not always at least have to acknowledge the fact that frequently we think of something and at the same time make a judgement about it or desire it? So there would still be several simultaneous mental phenomena. Indeed, we could, with more reason, make the opposite assertion, namely, that very often many mental phenomena are present in consciousness simultaneously, while there can never be more than one physical phenomenon at a time.

What is the only sense, then, in which we might say that a mental phenomenon always appears by itself, while many physical phenomena can appear at the same time? We can say this insofar as the whole multiplicity of mental phenomena which appear to us in our inner perception always appear as a unity, while the same is not true of the physical phenomena which we grasp simultaneously through the so-called external perception. As happens frequently in other cases, so here, too, unity is confused by many psychologists with simplicity; as a result they have maintained that they perceive themselves in inner consciousness as something simple. Others, in contesting with good reason the simplicity of this phenomenon, at the same time denied its unity. The former could not maintain a consistent position because, as soon as they described their inner life, they found that they were mentioning a large variety of different elements; and the latter could not avoid involuntarily testifying to the unity of mental phenomena. They speak, as do others, of an “I” and not of a “we” and sometimes describe this as a “bundle” of phenomena, and at the other times by other names which characterize a fusion into an inner unity. When we perceive color, sound, warmth, odor simultaneously¹⁸ nothing prevents us from assigning each one to a particular thing. On the other hand, we are forced to take the multiplicity of the various acts of sensing, such as seeing, hearing, experiencing warmth and smelling, and the simultaneous acts of willing and feeling and reflecting, as well as the inner perception which provides us with the knowledge of all those, as parts of one single phenomenon in which they are contained, as one single and unified thing. We shall discuss in detail later on what constitutes the basis for this necessity. At that time we shall also present several other points pertaining to the same subject. The topic under discussion, in fact, is nothing other than the so-called unity of consciousness, one of the most important, but still contested, facts of psychology.

9. Let us, in conclusion, summarize the results of the discussion about the difference between mental and physical phenomena. First of all, we illustrated the specific nature of the two classes by means of *examples*. We then defined mental phenomena as *presentations* or as phenomena which are based *upon presentation*; all the other phenomena being physical phenomena. Next we spoke of *extension*, which psychologists have asserted to be the specific characteristic of all physical phenomena, while all mental phenomena are supposed to be unextended. This assertion, however, ran into contradictions which can only be clarified by later investigations. All that can be determined now is that all mental phenomena really appear to be unextended.¹⁹ Further we found that the *intentional in-existence*, the reference to something as an object,²⁰ is a distinguishing characteristic of all mental phe-

¹⁸ This is another example of what Brentano means by “external perception” in the strict sense.

¹⁹ The definition is negative: we do not perceive mental phenomena to be extended.

²⁰ This form of expression: “reference to something as an object” is the one which characterizes the situation more clearly. Brentano continues to use it after he had recognized that “mental inexistence of the object” was a defective description. He is also accustomed to saying: I make (have) something (as) my object. See the Introduction and Note 11.

nomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything similar. We went on to define mental phenomena as the exclusive *object of inner perception*; they alone, therefore, are perceived with immediate evidence. Indeed, in the strict sense of the word, they alone are perceived. On this basis we proceeded to define them as the only phenomena which possess *actual existence* in addition to intentional existence.²¹ Finally, we emphasized as a distinguishing characteristic the fact that the mental phenomena which we perceive, in spite of all their multiplicity, *always* appear to us *as a unity*, while physical phenomena, which we perceive at the same time, do not all appear in the same way as parts of one single phenomenon.

That feature which best characterizes mental phenomena is undoubtedly their intentional in-existence. By means of this and the other characteristics listed above, we may now consider mental phenomena to have been clearly differentiated from physical phenomena.²²

Our explanations of mental and physical phenomena cannot fail to place our earlier definitions of psychology and natural science in a clearer light. In fact, we have stated that the one is the science of mental phenomena, and the other the science of physical phenomena. It is now easy to see that both definitions tacitly include certain limitations.

This is especially true of the definition of the natural sciences. These sciences do not deal with all physical phenomena, but only with those which appear in sensation, and as such do not take into account the phenomena of imagination. And even in regard to the former they only determine their laws insofar as they depend on the physical stimulation of the sense organs. We could express the scientific task of the natural sciences by saying something to the effect that they are those sciences which seek to explain the succession of physical phenomena connected with normal and pure sensations (that is, sensations which are not influenced by special mental conditions and processes) on the basis of the assumption of a world which resembles one which has three dimensional extension in space and flows in *one* direction in time, and which influences our sense organs.* Without explaining the absolute nature of this world, these sciences would limit themselves to ascribing to its forces capable of producing sensations and of exerting a reciprocal influence upon one another, and determining for these forces the laws of co-existence and succession. Through these laws they would then establish indirectly the laws of succession of the physical phenomena of sensations, if, through scientific abstraction from the concomitant mental conditions, we

²¹ That is to say, I bring the “mental phenomena” before my mind in presentation and believe in them in the secondary consciousness with a correct, indeed evident belief. It is a blind compulsion which makes me believe in the “physical phenomena” (colors, sounds, etc.), on the other hand. They exist only intentionally, i.e. as present to my mind, i.e. I exist as someone perceiving or having a presentation of them, but they do *not* exist. See notes 13 and 15 to I, 1 and note 2 to II, 1. (See the Introduction on Brentano’s appreciation of Comte, and p. 99.)

²² So in Brentano’s opinion the really characteristic property is *intentional* reference. The additional ones only “clarify” the definition of mental phenomena. That is to be noted as against Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, II, 856.

* Cp. Überweg (*System der Logik*) in whose analysis not everything can be accepted. In particular, he is wrong when he asserts that the world of external causes is extended in space and time, instead of saying that it resembles one which is spatially and temporally extended.²³

admit that they manifest themselves in a pure state and as occurring in relation to a constant sensory capacity. We must interpret the expression “science of physical phenomena” in this somewhat complicated way if we want to identify it with natural science.[†]

We have nevertheless seen how the expression “physical phenomenon” is sometimes erroneously applied to the above mentioned forces themselves. And, since normally the object of a science is characterized as that object whose laws such a science determines directly and explicitly, I believe I will not be mistaken if I assume that the definition of natural science as the science of physical phenomena is frequently connected with the concept of forces belonging to a world which is similar to one extended in space and flowing in time; forces which, through their influence on the sense organs, arouse sensation and mutually influence each other in their action, and of which natural science investigates the laws of co-existence and succession. If those forces are considered as the object of natural sciences, there is also the advantage that this science appears to have as its object something that really and truly exists. This could, of course, also be attained if natural science were denned as the science of sensation, tacitly adding the same restriction which we have just mentioned. Indeed, the reason why the expression “physical phenomenon” is preferred probably stems from the fact that certain psychologists have thought that the external causes of sensations correspond to the physical phenomena which occur in them, either in all respects, which was the original point of view, or at least in respect to three-dimensional extension, which is the opinion of certain people at the present time. It is clear that the otherwise improper expression “external perception” stems from this conception. It must be added, however, that the act of sensing manifests, in addition to the intentional in-existence of the physical phenomenon, other characteristics with which the natural scientist is not at all concerned, since through them sensation does not give us information in the same way about the distinctive relationships which govern the external world.

[†] This explanation does not coincide entirely with Kant’s premises, but it approaches as far as possible his explanation. In a certain sense it comes nearer to J.S.Mill’s views in his book against Hamilton (Chap. 11), without, however, agreeing with it in all the essential aspects. What Mill calls “the permanent possibilities of sensation,” is closely related to what we have called forces. The relationship of our view with, as well as its essential departure from, Überweg’s conception was already touched upon in the previous note.

²³ See above, note 7 to I,1. We directly and concretely perceive things that are spatially and temporally relative. The actual spatial and temporal properties of the “world” are similar since they exhibit like relations (of distance and direction), but there must also be absolute properties which are concealed from us in their specific forms. Since anything that is spatially and temporally relative still falls under the general concept of the spatial and temporal, Überweg’s form of expression is unobjectionable. Later on Brentano himself used the same expression as Überweg, as he had earlier done in his article on Comte. See the Introduction, and Brentano’s articles, “*August Comte und die positive Philosophie*” and “*Zur Lehre von Raum und Zeit.*”

With respect to the definition of psychology, it might first seem as if the concept of mental phenomena would have to be broadened rather than narrowed, both because the physical phenomena of imagination fall within its scope at least as much as mental phenomena as previously defined, and because the phenomena which occur in sensation cannot be disregarded in the theory of sensation. It is obvious, however, that they are taken into account only as the content²⁴ of mental phenomena when we describe the specific characteristics of the latter. The same is true of all mental phenomena which have a purely phenomenal existence.²⁵ We must consider only mental phenomena in the sense of real states as the proper object of psychology. And it is in reference only to these phenomena that we say that psychology is the science of mental phenomena.

²⁴ Content=object.

²⁵ *Imagined* mental phenomena have mere phenomenal existence, i.e. I make a primary object of something which is a secondary object of consciousness. (See further below and the Supplementary Essays.)